In regard to its national citizenship policies, no other country has been subject to as much criticism or publication as Germany. Despite historically being one of the largest immigrant receiving countries in the world, the successive governments in the Federal Republic today still stick close to the notion that ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungland’. Up until recently, Germany’s policy has been viewed as ‘outdated’, not aligning with nor acknowledging the demographic realities that exist in todays contemporary Germany. However, the countries restrictive policy has seen a considerable shift in the past decade, with not only the naturalisation requirements being loosened to some extent in 1993, but the introduction of the new Nationality Act, which was implemented on January 1st, 2000. However, the full extent by which these new policies have or will elicit any change to the current and future migrant situation in Germany is one that is open to interpretation. In order to best illustrate to what extent has Germany’s position changed in regard to its position as ‘kein Einwanderungsland’, a historical overview of Germany’s citizenship laws, including the pressures for liberalisation that occurred throughout the 1970’s up until the 1990s, will be referenced to thus outline how the country’s policies have developed over time, starting from the implementation of the Nationality Law of 1913.

The concept of *jus sanguinis* has long been associated with Germany as its traditional form of citizenship ascription[[1]](#endnote-1)**,**  however it should be noted that most German states abided by *jus domicili[[2]](#endnote-2)* for the first half of the nineteenth century. *Jus sanguinis* was first introduced through the Bavarian citizenship edict of 1818, but then found a more general acceptance after the formation of the Prussian citizenship law of 1842[[3]](#endnote-3). Germany’s definition of nationhood was embodied through the *jus sanguinis* principle as the emphasis on descent rather than residence began to gradually increase in the nineteenth centuryand this coincided with the rise of the ‘Volk’ (people), which gave prominence to the idea of genetics, considering it only logical that membership only be passed on via blood. *Jus sanguinis* was then finally concretised within the German Nationality Law of 1913, by which the notion of the ‘Volk’ had become widely accepted as a political goal of imperial Germany and ‘thus come to epitomise the quest for ethnocultural homogeneity’ (Green, 2000, p.109).

This emphasis on bloodline and its link to true citizenship rights was a principle that appealed to the Nazi regime and the essence of *jus sanguinis* was exploited as a tool to implement racial hierarchy and commit mass murder. Alongside revoking the citizenship rights of German Jews, they also revoked the citizenship of those viewed to have ‘violated a duty of loyalty to the German Empire or the ‘German Nation’ (Howard, 2008, p.42). After the rise of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the original citizenship policy of 1913 remained in place, despite its former exploitation by the Nazis. The RuStAg became the foundation of post- war German citizenship, complemented by Article 116 section 1 of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law, which defines being ‘German’ as: ‘(1) anyone who holds German citizenship; (2) anyone who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin (*deutscher Volkszugehӧriger)* or as their spouse of descendent’[[4]](#endnote-4).

The encapsulation of these two laws acted to serve two main purposes: firstly, they facilitated the integrative process of the 8 million German war refugees that had arrived into West Germany by 1950**,** whilst also reinforcing the ethnocultural nature of bloodline which still remained as the foundation of the nations citizenship policy. The right to German citizenship was extended to refugees of ethnic German origin, who were scattered throughout eastern bloc countries like Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union. These two laws were concretised within the 1953 Federal Expellee Law of the FRG, which gave the ‘right to return’ to all ethnic Germans, the usual circumstances being that many had little direct link to Germany as their ancestors had emigrated to other countries long before.

The implementation of Germany’s ‘guest worker’ programmes brought about a huge shift to the demographic situation in Germany society, as millions of working men from countries such as Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy were cycled in an out of the country, from the mid -1950s up until 1973. At it’s peak, roughly 14 million guest workers resided in Germany in 1973, 11 million of whom returned to their original countries after the end of the guest worker programme that ended due to the oil crisis**.** The 3 million that remained predominantly consisted of Turkish migrants and due to family reunification and having children who are born on German soil, this has had a heavy constitution to the demographic image of Germany that we see today as the country is now home to roughly 7.3 million foreigners, making up about 9% of the general population[[5]](#endnote-5) **.**

The permanent residence of these guestworkers after the end of the recruitment programme in 1973 evoked the question as to whether and under what circumstances should these immigrants be granted German citizenship. RuStAG constituted that the only route to gaining citizenship was through naturalisation, but the requirements for naturalisation at this time were seemingly too broad. Consequently, in 1977 the Federal Government introduced a set of non- binding guidelines (*Einburgerungsrichtlinien*) which set up the preconditions required in order to be granted citizenship. The requirements included: at least ten years of residence, cultural assimilation characterised by a ‘voluntary and lasting orientation towards Germany’ *(freie und dauernde Hinwendung zu Deutschland)[[6]](#endnote-6)*.The principle of holding dual citizenship was also rejected. Section 2.3 of the afore mentioned ‘*Einburgerungsrichtlinien*’ acted out to reaffirm the governments underline advocacy of Germany’s ethnocultural exclusivity: ‘The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not seek to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation’[[7]](#endnote-7). The high level of requirement needed for integration combined with the ‘not a country of immigration’ maxim kept the naturalisation rates extremely low during the 1980s. It was thought that by accepting foreigners into the national community, the Federal Republic ran the risk of having to redefine Germany’s national identity whilst also ‘diluting the Federal Republic’s historical obligation to its dispersed and repressed co- ethnics in the East’ (Joppke, 1999, p.63). Yet, this failed to relate to the reality of the millions of guestworkers who had firmly established their residence and showed no sign of leaving.

The principle of *jus sanguinis* and its upkeeping became outdated and impractical by the time of Germany’s unification in 1990 and after the break down of the Soviet bloc in 1991. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) meant the automatic granting of citizenship to all East Germans to the FRG on the 3rd of October 1990. Additionally, the collapse of communism ultimately encouraged many ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to claim lineage to their German bloodline and thus the notion of *jus sanguinis* seemingly became more and more difficult to justify. Simultaneously the denial of *jus soli* became even more difficult to defend as it was evident that Germany had in fact become the permanent residency of foreigners, who were in full- time employment and were raising their entire families there. The discrepancy between ‘ethnic Germans’, who were granted automatic citizenship yet had little to no knowledge of German culture and the population of German- born Turks, who were integrated within German society by either studying or working productively, yet were not being allowed citizenship, became increasingly more difficult to justify, both morally and economically. The former Nationality Law of 1913 and its justification in the post- war Federal republic was deemed acceptable in the context of the Cold War, however its rationalization after Germany’s unification appeared both outdated and offensive.

Germany was subject to significant international pressures to push its citizenship policy in a liberalising direction. Unlike other EU countries, Germany was under intense scrutiny, given the number of foreign residents that were living there and in light of its Nazi past. The stigma of the Nationality Law of 1913 was seen as synonymous with the Nazi regime and racist connotations, thus Germany experienced significant domestic pressure to amend this association. As International bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the Council of Europe began to assume a moral and judicial role in Europe, ‘there was a sense that Germany’s law stood out as antiquated, inhumane, and in need of ‘modernisation’ (Howard, 2008, p.44). Additionally, Germany’s move towards liberalisation also served as an economic motive. As Anil states ‘Liberalising citizenship regulation was also seen as a way to improve Germany’s image in order to attract highly skilled workers… Compared to traditional immigrant receiving countries, Germany’s exclusive citizenship policy was a disadvantage in the highly competitive international labour market form skilled workers’[[8]](#endnote-8). Essentially, the need for high- skilled labour in particular drove many businesses to advocate for a more liberalised citizenship policy. However, this was also the situation for other countries such as Italy, Denmark, or Austria that did not need to liberalise, therefore the need for high- skilled labour is not adequate enough to account for Germany’s change.

A pivotal point in Germany’s liberalisation of its citizenship law took place on the 27th September 1998, when the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens won the national elections over the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP), who had been long been the governing coalition. The implementation of this reform had been arranged over the preceding 16 years by representatives from all parties. Although there was discrepancies in respect to how best to proceed, all parties agreed that the status quo of the 1980s and early 1990s regarding how ‘ethnic Germans’ were being granted citizenship with ease and the issue of the arduous requirements needed by long- term immigrants in order to facilitate naturalization was no longer justifiable. Political debate in regard to the direction of Germany’s citizenship policy took place in the 1980s and gained momentum in the 1990s. This would involve all of the main political parties also including some academics and legal experts, yet these discussions would remain at elite level up until January of 1999. A conscious effort by all the political parties was made to ‘avoid any public reaction by keeping the matter out of public debate’[[9]](#endnote-9).

The direction to liberalisation was forwarded most heavily by parties on the left. For example, in 1982 the SPD and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt tried to pass a law that would grant citizenship to those who were born and raised in Germany upon reaching adulthood, formally known as the *jus soli* principle. This proposal would be blocked by the CDU/CSU party, who would then go on to win the national Bundestag elections later that year and form a coalition with the FDP. The proposal for the revision of jus *soli* would be repeated in subsequent years- 1986, 1988, 1989 on a regional level and on a national level in 1989.

The CDU/CSU- FDP coalition, which began in 1982 and lasted until 1998, showed no immediate intentions of liberalising the already existing citizenship policy, stating that the law was ‘sufficient and took the needs of foreigners into account, particularly those of the second generation’[[10]](#endnote-10). However, the CDU/ CSU politician’s openness to liberalising its citizenship policy eventually grew over the next decade having realised the status quo was no longer viable. Additionally, the FDP’s position ‘lay between that of the SPD and the CDU/CSU in its inclusiveness, as the party called for a general ease in policy and a right to citizenship for young foreigners, while stopping short of advocating *jus soli’[[11]](#endnote-11)* . The FDP sought out to distinguish itself from its larger coalition partner and highlight its liberal stance by advocating ‘humane’ citizenship polices, which would include dual citizenship.

By 1990, the FDP and CDU/CSU would be brought together by Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and reach a compromise by which a ‘‘calculable’ naturalisation criteria, based on clear and objective criteria’ (Howard, 2008, p.48) would be created. This resulted in the 1990 citizenship law, which would present a slight liberalisation of the requirements to naturalisation. Although the decision in approving naturalisation was ultimately left up to the decision of the local or regional bureaucrats, who had the right to reject applications, this new reform ‘represented the first legal change in citizenship policy in an inclusive direction since Prussia’s institution of German citizenship law in 1913’[[12]](#endnote-12). In 1993, a small revision was made to the former 1990 law, which made naturalisation an entitlement as opposed to discretionary, if applicants met the naturalisation requirements.

In short, the 1990 and subsequent 1993 reforms were a result of the pressure exercised by the opposing SPD and Greens party, an increased influence to liberalise within the CDU itself, the FDP’s demands from its larger coalition partner and the aid from Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU). The reforms were in full effect, as the decade between 1986 and 1996 showed that the rate of naturalisation had increased by up to 4 times[[13]](#endnote-13). Seemingly, ‘the long- standing definition of German citizenship as being based on German descent was finally modified’ (Howard, 2008, p.48) and further reform would continue to develop over the following years.

As briefly mentioned before, the SPD and Green’s national election victory in 1998 would become a turning point in Germany’s move to further liberalise its citizenship policy. Under chancellor Gerhard Schrӧder, he immediately went ahead and made a fundamental change to the existing citizenship law upon taking office. The SPD and Green’s made a proposal that was remarkably ambitious: ‘establish *jus soli* for foreign children born on German soil, to ease naturalisation rights for foreigners residing in Germany, and most importantly- and most controversially- to allow foreigners to hold dual citizenship by acquiring German citizenship while maintaining their current nationality as well’ (Howard, 2008, p.49). This proposal would present a radical departure from former policies and forwarded the possibility of German society moving towards a direction that ‘not only accepts but also values pluralism and diversity, instead of categorising people in primordial, racial terms’ (Howard, 2008, p.50).

The SPD- Green government remained optimistic in their proposal and this was expressed in Schrӧder’s bold speech to the Bundestag on the 10th November 1998, where he confidently stated:

‘This government will modernise the law on nationality. That will enable those living permanently in Germany and their children born here to acquire full rights to citizenship. No one who wants to be a German citizen should have to renounce or deny his foreign roots. That is why we will also allow dual nationality.’[[14]](#endnote-14).

The proceedings to implement the change were anticipated to be carried out relatively smoothly in early 1999, due to the new Interior Minister Otto Schilly claiming that citizenship liberalisation was ‘long overdue’[[15]](#endnote-15). Despite the determination and optimism shown by the SPD- Green party, what could not be foreseen was how citizenship would soon no longer be exclusive as an issue of elite discussion, but soon would be made a matter of public concern, in which their opinion and mobilisation would eventually become a decisive factor the against the liberalisation of the citizenship law.

The liberalisation of the law carried out in the 1980s and 1990s was intentionally not brought to the public as the politicians of various parties feared the anti- immigrant sentiment could heighten and potentially favour those of the radical right, which could ultimately threaten Germany’s international reputation and political stability. Although the sentiment indicated in Schrӧder’s public Bundestag speech expressed a bold and ambitious vison of the future, the fact that it was made in the aftermath of a bitter election would ultimately be damaging to any possibility of his proposal.

The debate regarding the citizenship law was no longer kept internally within the Bundestag once Schrӧder made his proposal public. This would be potentially detrimental for those in favour of liberalising the citizenship laws, due to the stigma that many German’s held anti- immigrant views, particularly when it came to the issue of dual citizenship. Before 1998, even the centre- right parties were careful to avoid the anti- foreigner sentiment, fearing the potential up rise of right-wing extremism, which would ultimately affect the country’s reputation abroad. However, after witnessing the political direction in which the SPD- Green’s were heading the CDU/CSU ‘decided to rouse up these latent tendencies in order to stop a political process they could no longer directly control’ (Howard, 2008, p.51).

The CDU/CSU were very vocal with how they felt regarding the SPD- Green proposal for several months, arguing that ‘foreigners will have a huge advantage over Germans’ and that ‘Germany will be transformed into a land of immigration, a land of unlimited immigration’[[16]](#endnote-16). On the 13th January 1999, a citizenship reform bill was introduced and seemingly the public condemnations that the CDU/CSU had made over the previous months had forced Schrӧder to retract from his original statement: ‘I stress: I do not want dual citizenship, but I will accept it in order to serve the goal of integration’[[17]](#endnote-17). Essentially, the CDU/CSU argued that by allowing dual citizenship, immigrants would be encouraged to have divided loyalties and thus not promote their integration within German society.

In the run- up to the 1999 regional elections to state parliament, which were to be held in Hessen, public opinion became increasingly and self- consciously anti- immigrant. With this notion in mind, the CDU/ CSU made a crucial strategic move which would act in their favour in their campaign against dual citizenship: ‘rather than fighting the government in parliament, where there were a minority in both houses, they took the debate to the streets’[[18]](#endnote-18) . The outcome was a signature campaign against dual citizenship, endorsed by Wolfgang Schäuble, the chairman of the CDU party at that time. The focus of the petition campaign would specifically be targeting the upcoming *Landtag* elections in Hessen, ‘which had traditionally been a Social Democratic stronghold’ (Howard, 2008, p.51). The success of the campaign would mean the CDU would be able to take over the majority of seats in the Bundesrat and thus be able to veto any legislation that had been approved by the government. With this, it would be clear to the SPD- Green’s the German public shared the views of the CDU/CSU in regard to the issue of dual citizenship.

Accumulating over 5 million signatures in just under six weeks, the campaign would be even more successful than the CDU/ CSU ever could have originally anticipated. All the campaigning and public mobilisation would eventually lead to the demoralising defeat of the SPD- Green’s, meaning that the government was no longer eligible to pass its own proposal. The SPD- Green’s were left with the option to either abandon the hopes of their proposed reform or opt for a much watered- down compromise with the FDP, who were open to liberalising citizenship but remained completely opposed to the possibility of dual citizenship. In short, once the CDU/CSU made the strategic move to politicise the liberalisation process, which had been kept at elite level for nearly two decades, ‘the process of liberalisation was abruptly and stunningly halted, leading to a backlash of restrictive measures that were amended to the government’s original proposal’ (Howard, 2008, p.52). This restrictive backlash would ultimately be a contributing factor to the political image of contemporary Germany that we see today in regard to its stance on dual citizenship.

The German Nationality Act of 2000 was the result of the political turmoil that had occurred over the past 5 months. The act was proposed by the SPD- Green’s in March of 1999, had the support of the FDP, tolerated by the CDU/CSU and was in full effect on 1 January 2000. The new compromise law saw predominantly only 3 main changes, due to the recent amendment in 1993. The first change saw a reduction in the residency requirement from 15 years to 8, yet ‘this only applies to people who have a valid residence permit, gainful employment, no criminal convictions, and are willing to give up their prior citizenship’ (Howard, 2008 p. 53). Secondly, the principle of *jus soli* was introduced with certain provisions, as the German issue of the law does not contain *double jus soli –* ‘whereby the (‘third- generation’) German- born children of a (‘second- generation’) German- born person would automatically receive German citizenship, regardless of the status of that person’s residence permit’ (Howard, 2008, p.53). *Jus soli* would grant automatic German citizenship, to those born on German soil, given that at least one of the parents had acquired a legal residence permit of 8 years or an unlimited residence permit of 3 years. However, the requirements to obtain said permits are difficult, thus many foreigners remain excluded by this principle. The third component of the new law introduced the *Optionsmodell* and dual citizenship with some provisions. Children who automatically receive German citizenship by means of *jus soli* are eligible to hold dual citizenship up until the age of 18 but must then choose which form of citizenship they would like to hold. This component essentially emulates the same plan that the FDP and CDU had developed in the mid-1990s, but with some alteration. The prevention of dual citizenship remains underline as the core feature of the new citizenship law, stated by Green: ‘If the introduction of *jus soli* constitutes the main innovation of the new law, it is the steadfast desire to avoid dual citizenship which lies at the heart of Germany’s citizenship policy’ (Green, 2000, p.116).

To some extent, it could be argued that the new law does liberalise the issue of dual citizenship, as the *Optionsmodell* does permit children who are granted German citizenship via *jus soli* dual citizenship albeit temporarily. Although an estimated number of over two million residents hold dual citizenship in Germany, a closer examination of these figures suggests that the majority of these citizens are made up of either children of bi- national parents or ‘ethnic Germans’, who have immigrated from Europe[[19]](#endnote-19). The acceptance of dual citizenship for ethnic Germans, contrasted with the inherent prevention of dual citizenship for non- ethnic German immigrants could be, as Green characterises, ‘a blatant hypocrisy’ that exhibits the perpetuation of Germany’s ‘ethnocultural’ ideology, in spite of the new law’s movement towards liberalisation[[20]](#endnote-20). Additionally, for the case of non- ethnic German’s, Green suggests that ‘those who have gained dual identity as a result of naturalisation, either as a long- term resident non- national or as the spouse of a German citizen, constitute a clear minority of cases. Yet despite their small number, it is this category that has been by far the most politically controversial’[[21]](#endnote-21) .

In principle, the new Nationality Act 2000 does represent a distinct liberalisation of the former 1913 law and its subsequent amendments in 1990 and 1993. Despite the restrictions the new law presents for immigrants with regard to holding dual citizenship, it is also representative of a departure from the *jus sanguinis* sentiment.

The extent to which the Nationality Act 2000 has actually resulted in a significant or substantial reform of the former 1913 law is a matter that has gone under little analysis. In fact, the issue entirely has seemingly disappeared from public debate. Although it may be too early to see the effects, some informed hypothesis is warranted, in order to speculate the future make- up of German society, given how significant the issue of citizenship is in determining this.

With regard to whether the new Nationality Act will lead to an increase in foreigners seeking German citizenship, recent figures show a decline in the number of naturalisations since 2000. In 2000, the number of naturalisations reached its peak, accumulating over 180,000. Yet, this figure has continued to progressively decrease up until 2006[[22]](#endnote-22). These figures are forwarded by Green, who states, ‘while the incremental liberalisation of German citizenship during the 1990s is undeniable, the changes introduced have only had a comparatively modest impact’ (Green, 2000, p.117). The current trend would suggest that the new law will have had little effect on the current situation and in this sense, the CDU and FDP will have fulfilled what they originally set out to achieve when they sought out to campaign against the SPD- Green proposal in 1999.

The issue as to why so few eligible foreigners seek out to obtain German citizenship is a topic that needs further examination, given the current pattern of naturalisations that occur each year. The explanation involves both the binding terms of the new law as well as its unwritten effect. The welfare state benefits in Germany permits many foreigners to receive various rights and privileges, besides the right to vote. Arguably the benefits are so generous that many foreigners therefore do not feel any real incentive to acquire German citizenship as they already feel satisfied with the welfare benefits. Additionally, many foreigners in Germany may simply not wish to give up their current citizenship. The sentiment of bloodline and patriotism is particularly pronounced in some countries, such as Turkey and Poland. Many fear that by renouncing their current citizenship, they will thus relinquish any connection they have to their home country, including inheritance and burial rights which is something many are not willing to do. Another reason considers the perception that Germany is a country that is not particularly hospitable towards immigrants. Due to the stigma of Germany’s racist and Nazi past, it could be inferred that many immigrants would prefer to live somewhere else. This is illustrated in the ‘Green Card’ programme which was widely- publicised by the SPD- Green government, which sought out to fill jobs in the technological field by attracting high- skilled labour from other countries. The government was unable to reach its target of 20,000 workers[[23]](#endnote-23), thus suggesting that Germany does not particularly appeal immigrants, even when the country shows it has economic demand.

The process for naturalisation is still complex, with the procedure time potentially taking up to 4 years. Additionally, people seeking naturalisation are not only required to pay a fee for obtaining German citizenship, but they are also required to pay for renouncing their current citizenship. The complicated process of naturalisation leads Green to conclude that ‘Germany in effect discourages naturalisations and thereby continues to operate a broadly exclusive citizenship’[[24]](#endnote-24) whilst also retaining ‘more than a whiff of ethnocultural exclusivity’[[25]](#endnote-25).

So far, the new law has not produced any dramatic change in regard to more foreigners going through the necessary procedures to acquire German citizenship, yet how the new law will affect the future demographic image of Germany is open to interpretation. Howard offers two possible interpretations, one seemingly pessimistic and the other rather optimistic. The failure to implement Schrӧder’s dual citizenship plan represents a lost opportunity for foreign integration. Ultimately, until a significant number of foreigners choose to acquire German citizenship and actively integrate within German society, they will otherwise foreseeably remain segregated from society as third- class residents who may potentially be under threat of discrimination, whilst German lineage will remain as the primordial right to citizenship. These factors lead Howard to conclude that ‘the ‘new’ citizenship law will actually accomplish little substantive change or improvement, at least in the short and medium term’. (Howard, 2008, p. 57).

The second interpretation is emphasised by the SPD- Greens, who recognise the Hessen elections as a disaster, but remain adamant in highlighting the positive repercussions of the compromise law. With this optimistic view, it is important to consider that dual citizenship could have been a farfetched and politically naïve goal. Although it may be considered as only a partial liberalisation of the former 1913 law, it is a forward step in making it easier for foreigners to obtain German citizenship. Although it may take decades to build up momentum, arguably the process of further integration seems ultimately inevitable, given that they have already become an integral part of society. The presence of foreigners is ultimately a vital facet to the country’s technological industry and the future social security system. Additionally, children of foreigners are eligible for acquiring German citizenship via *jus soli* when they turn 18 and many may opt for German citizenship. Although it may be too early to infer, by this interpretation Howard suggests that ‘in due course Germany will eventually reach a point when a critical mass of foreigners will successfully seek and acquire German citizenship, thus encouraging and opening the door for the millions of others who are eligible’ (Howard, 2008, p.58).

In conclusion, the position that ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland‘ has changed, as the Nationality Act 2000 does represent Germany moving in a liberalising direction when compared to the former 1913 law. Germany was subject to substantial international and domestic pressures to amend their citizenship policy, yet it is the anti- immigrant sentiment that has restricted the full extent of liberalisation.

Notes

1. For instance Hailbronner, ‘Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany, p.77 [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. A. Fahrmeier, ‘Nineteenth- Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration’, *Historical Journal,* 40/3 (1997), pp. 721-52. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Green, ‘The politics of Exclusion’, pp. 187- 97. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Official translation by the Federal Press and Information Office. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Philip Martin, ‘’There is Nothing more Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers’ (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration studies, 2001), p.3. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. *Einburgeungsrichtlinien* of 15 Dec. 1977. For details, see Green, ‚Citizenship Policy in Germany’, pp. 30-31. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Translation taken from Green, ‘Citizenship Policy in Germany’, p.30. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Merih Anil, ‘No more Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, pp.44-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political discourse and the Politics of Nationality reform in France and Germany, p.429- 58. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? ’ p.32- 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? ’ p.39. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? ’ p.34. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.221. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. From the official translation, made available by the German Information Center. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Migration News 5/11 (November 1998) [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Migration News 5/11 (November 1998) [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Migration News 6/2 (November 1998) [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.638. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. According to Green, ‘Between 1975 and 1997, almost 780,000 German children were born to bi- national (married) parents’, Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.925. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism’, p.119. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.927 [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Migration News 6/2 (February 1999) [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Horst Siebert, ‘German: An Immigration Country, pp.12-13. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.921. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid, p.948.

    Footnotes

    Simon Green, ‘Beyond ethnoculturalism? German citizenship in the new millennium’, *German Politics*, 9:3 (2000), 105-124

    * Marc Morjé Howard, ‘The causes and consequences of Germany’s new Citizenship Law’, *German Politics*, 17:1 (2008), 41-62.

    Christian Joppke, ‘Not a Country of Immigration: Germany’, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain,* (1999), 62-70. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)